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Chapter 11
Pensions in Brazil: Reaching the Limits of
Parametric Reform in Latin America
Milko Matijascic and Stephen J. Kay

Brazil is an outlier with respect to pension reform in Latin America.
Countries throughout the region, including Southern Cone neighbors
Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, have introduced structural reforms that
include private individual investment accounts designed to complement or
replace state-run PAYGO systems (see Matijascic and Kay 2006). Brazil has
instead engaged in parametric reforms. Inspired by the Swedish and Italian
reforms, Brazil has instituted DCs without the funded accounts seen in the
rest of the region.
The history of social security in Brazil is also distinct from that of its
neighbors. Among other factors, social security is codified in the 1988
Constitution, its broad coverage and benefits structure make it the single
largest national antipoverty program in the region, and a significant private
pension fund sector had already developed even in the absence of mandated individual accounts. Although a few political leaders have favored
private accounts (most notably ex-President Cardoso), individual accounts
never received much political traction in Brazil, in part because moving
to a private-funded system while still honoring commitments in the public
system would entail prohibitively high transition costs, equal to 201 percent
of GDP (ECLAC 2006: 127).
Brazil’s 1988 Constitution includes several measures that universalized
and raised social security benefits. It doubled rural pensions, recalculated
pension levels to make up for value eroded by inflation, introduced indexing against inflation, and made the minimum wage the minimum pension
level. It also permitted social security to be financed through taxes on gross
revenues, financial transactions, and net profit. While codifying benefit
levels in the Constitution provides greater legal protection for beneficiaries,
these benefits have proven difficult to finance, especially because funds
earmarked for social security have been used to fund a range of nonsocialsecurity-related public expenditures. Furthermore, because benefit levels
Opinions and errors are solely those of the authors and do not reflect views of the institutions
with whom the authors are affiliated.
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are defined in the Constitution, revisions require a constitutional amendment, which in turn requires a three-fifths majority in the Chamber of
Deputies.
This chapter describes Brazil’s social security system and the highly contentious process of reform, and concludes with an assessment of current
policy dilemmas.

From Social Insurance to Social Security
Retirement coverage in Brazil harks back to the colonial period, when in
1554 the Santa Casa de Misericórdia in Santos first provided pensions.
After the installation of the Portuguese Court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808,
coverage was provided to select civil servants. This pattern of segmented
coverage endured until the early twentieth century. In 1919, after the
formation of the International Labor Bureau, accident insurance was provided via mandatory contributions. These developments mirrored those in
neighboring countries and represented the beginnings of what eventually
became identified as social security.
Later milestones include the 1923 creation of the Caixas de Aposentadorias e Pensões (CAPs, or Pension and Retirement Funds), which were
DB programs funded with contributions from employees, employers, and
the state that provided coverage for disability, illness, premature death, and
time of service. In 1933 CAPs began to be replaced by the Institutos de
Aposentadorias e Pensões (IAPs, or Retirement Pension Institutes), which
ceased to exist in 1966, when they were centralized. The basic institutional
characteristics of Brazilian pension programs since 1923 are outlined in
Table 11-1.
Social security legislation since 1919, summarized in Table 11-2, reflects
increasing state intervention, centralization, and universalization of coverage for workers in more precarious occupations—all of which was foreseen
in 1945 but not enacted until the early 1970s. Initial regulations were tightly
linked to Brazil’s labor code, but over time most elements began to be seen
as social rights and took on their own juridical identity.
The impact of the 1988 Constitution, which specified the parameters
of social protection, is critical to understanding how events unfolded in
subsequent years. There was considerable controversy over specific language in the Constitution that critics viewed as inefficient and financially
onerous but that supporters viewed as necessary to reduce Brazil’s perennial inequality. For the first time, universal coverage guaranteeing equal
treatment of all workers was enacted. In addition, rural workers were given
the right to retire five years before urban workers, and women have the
right to retire five years before men or with five fewer years of service. A
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Table 11-1 Institutional Structure of Social Security (1923–2006)
Structure

CAPs 1923–31

Collective capitalization
and DB
Benefits
Uniform
Management Sponsoring firms
Coverage
Authorized firms

IAPs 1931–67

RGPS since 1967

Financing

—

PAYGO and DB

Civil servants

By institution

By labor category
State
Select
occupations
IPASE

Regulation

Finance Ministry

Labor Ministry

Uniform
—
Universal (after
1974)
IPASE (until 1978)
and by statute
Social Security
Ministry

Source: MPAS (2002).
Notes: RGPS = Regime Geral de Previdência Social, or General Social Security Regime; IPASE
= Instituto de Previdencia e Assistencia dos Servidores do Estado, or State Employees Social
Security Institute.

critical feature of the pension system since the Constitution was enacted is
the 1991 linkage of pensions and the minimum wage.
To confer credibility on these new reforms, the government created the
Social Security Budget (Orçamento de Seguridade Social, or OSS) and
funded it from multiple sources—including payroll taxes, taxes on earnings
and profits, and, beginning in 1993, a tax on financial transactions. The
purpose of the OSS was to fund pensions, health care, and social assistance.
This lumping together of all these issues under a new legal definition
of security (seguridade, in Portuguese) could presumably insulate social
spending from political interference by the Finance Ministry and provide
policymakers with resources to better address social issues.
During the 1990s, Brazil instituted a number of parametric reforms while
its neighbors largely engaged in structural reform. The process is by no
means complete, and it is difficult to forecast what reforms will look like a
generation from now, or even when current impasses in the reform process
will be overcome.

A Process of Continuing Reform
Legislation since 1989 reflects a search for the means to improve revenue
collection and achieve greater fiscal balance, while at the same time extending coverage, especially for those segments of the population in the greatest
need (recent legislation is summarized in Table 11-3). Higher revenue was
achieved through new taxes and higher tax rates.

17:40
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Table 11-2 Principal Social Security Legislation (1919–88)
Year

Legislation

1919

Signature of ILO Convention on accident
insurance (insurance contracts)
Eloy Chaves Law ratified, creating CAPs
Labor Ministry created (responsible for social
security)
Minimum wage created—the basis for social
security benefits
Labor laws consolidated, guaranteeing right to a
pension
ISSB created—unified and universalized social
security
Unification of IAPs proposed
First statute enacted consolidating civil service
pensions
CAPs incorporated into IAPs
LOPS enacted
Minimum age for time of service pensions
eliminated
Pensions for rural workers created
(PRORURAL)
IAPs consolidated into INPS
Ministry of Labor and Social Security created
Incorporated worker accident insurance into the
INPS, ending insurance contracts
Pensions for rural workers created
(FUNRURAL)
Created Ministry of Social Security and Social
Assistance
Closed and open pension funds legislated
Ended IPASE; distinguished between civil
servants with and without INSS coverage
Created FINSOCIAL, currently COFINS
Constitutional guarantee of social security rights

1923
1931
1940
1943
1945
1947
1952
1953
1960
1962
1963
1966
1967
1967
1971
1974
1977
1978
1982
1988

Status
Until 1967
Until 1966
Until 1974
Current
Current
Not in effect
Not in effect
Current
Until 1967
Current
Current
Not in effect
Current via INSS
Until 1974
Current via INSS
Until 1988
Current
Current
Until 1988
Current
Current (in part)

Source: MPAS (2002).
Notes: ISSB = Instituto de Serviços Sociais do Brasil, or Brazilian Social Service Institute;
IAP = Institutos de Aposentadorias e Pensões, or Retirement Pension Institutes; LOPS =
Lei Orgânica da Previdência Social, or Organic Law of Social Security; PRORURAL = Previdência do Trabalhador Rural; INPS = Instituto Nacional de Previdência Social, or National
Social Security Institute; FUNRURAL = Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador Rural; INSS =
Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social, or National Institute of Social Insurance; FINSOCIAL
= Fundo de Investimento Social, or Social Investment Fund; COFINS = Contribuição para
o Financiamento da Seguridade Social, or Social Security Finance Contribution.
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Table 11-3 Evolution of Social Security Legislation (1989–2005)
Year

Legislation

1989
1990

Created CSLL
Approved special pension regimes (RPP) for all
public-sector employees
Approved new financing and benefit laws
Ended transfer of payroll tax resources for health
Created financial transactions tax (CPMF) to
finance health expenditures
Created constitutional revision authorizing
transfer of social security funds
Created a special tax regime for small- and
medium-sized businesses (SIMPLES)
Approved Constitutional Amendment 20
Created Social Security Factor (notional defined
accounts)
Created contribution for retired civil servants
(rejected by Supreme Court in 1999)
Approved Constitutional Amendment 41 (civil
servant pensions)
Lowered age for receiving old-age benefit via
LOAS from 67 years to 65 years
Social security revenue collected by the Treasury

1991
1993
1993
1994
1996
1998
1999
1999
2003
2003
2005

Status
Current
Current
Current (in part)
Current
Current
Until 2007
Current
Current (in part)
Current
Current
Current (in part)
Current
In transition

Source: MPAS (2000–5 editions).
Notes: CSLL = Contribuições sobre o Lucro Líquido, or Contribution over Liquid Profits;
RPP = Regime Próprio de Previdência; CPMF = Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentações Financeiras; LOAS = Lei Orgânica da Assistência Social, or social security law;
SIMPLES = Sistema Integrado de Pagamento de Impostos e Contribuições das Microempresas e Empresas de Pequeno Porte.

These legislative changes reflect a process of retrenchment of social
protection that is best understood within the context of the constitutional
reforms undertaken by the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration
presented in Table 11-4. As in the rest of Latin America, Brazil was moving toward a greater role for the market, cost containment, and what
Pierson (2001: 425) refers to as ‘recalibration’ (adapting rules to new
constraints).
In the wake of Constitutional Amendment 20, which was passed in 1998
during the Cardoso administration and which some critics considered
too timid a reform, President Lula’s administration sought to reduce the
differences in civil service pensions and pensions for private-sector workers covered by the Instituto Nacional de Seguro Social (INSS) (Berzoini
2003).

17:40

No mention
Match with INSS
Would create
Up to 50%
Not included
Not included

No limit
None
None

Implemented in 2001: Laws 108 and 109

Implemented in 2001: Laws 108 and 109

Up to 50%

For hazardous occupations and
primary/secondary teachers
Civil servants: 60 men, 55 women. None
for INSS
65 men, 60 women
60 men, 55 women
Minimum wage
10 CWs
Wages earned after July 1994 (Plano Real,
or Real Plan)
Notional defined accounts; age and time
of contribution (social security factor)
Tied exclusively to the general regime
Last salary
Expected, not yet implemented

Eliminate for new workers

Time of contribution

Approved by Congress (EC-20)
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Sources: Laws 108/2001 and 109/2001, Law 8.213/91, Proposed Constitutional Amendment 33-A, and Constitutional Amendment 20.
Notes: PEC = Projeto de Emenda Constitucional (proposed constitutional amendment); EC = Emenda Constitucional (constitutional amendment);
CW = contribution wage.

Financing via payroll
Special regimes (RPP)
Complementary pension
funds for RPP
Employer participation in
state-owned firms
Complementary pension fund
portability
Vesting in complementary
pension funds

Time of contribution

100% of contributions,
price-indexed
All social security programs
Last salary
None

Calculation formula

For occupations deemed
hazardous
60

Normal (after 15 years of
service)
None
65
65
Delink from minimum wage
Reduce value
Entire career

Eliminate

Available

65 men, 60 women
60 men, 55 women
Minimum wage
10 CWs
Final 36 months

Time of contribution

Proposals (PEC 33-A)

Time of service

Situation in 1995

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

Old-age retirement
Rural old-age retirement
Benefit floor
Benefit ceiling
Basis of benefit calculation

Minimum age

Ordinary—35 years service
men, 30 women
Proportional—30 years of
service men; 25, women
Special for professionals

Parameters

Table 11-4 Principal Reforms of the Cardoso Administration (1995–8)
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Table 11-5 outlines these reforms and compares the situation before the
1998 Cardoso reforms and the changes proposed by President Lula in 2003.
Table 11-5 shows that the most important change was the possibility of
creating DC pension funds for new civil servants, which introduced an
important change with respect to pension funds in Brazil. Formal guarantees for these new workers would be limited to no more than the INSS
benefit ceiling. The new rules would eliminate parity between pensions and
active civil servants’ salaries for new workers, while maintaining parity for
those already receiving benefits,1 and would require current civil servants
to stay on the job until aged 60 years to avoid any reduction in pensions.
It is important to note that these new rules exempt military and police
pensions.
The creation of DC individual accounts was delayed. The regulations
for EC-41 were postponed in part due to the difficulty of financing the
transition costs in a climate of urgent fiscal adjustment. Disagreement over
how such a system would be organized was also politically contentious, since
contributions on retirement benefits would mean reduced pensions. The
process remains incomplete, and pension reform will no doubt continue
to be a significant policy challenge in the decades to come.

Structure and Coverage
In the section below, we describe the current state of Brazil’s pension
systems as well as key issues from current debates over reform.

Institutions and Benefits
The federal social security system, compulsory for all salaried workers and
optional for the self-employed, has two regimes:

r The General Social Security Regime, managed by the INSS and encompassing all urban and rural private-sector employees, employees in
government-owned firms, and the self-employed.
r The Statutory Social Security Regimes for Civil Servants, covering all federal
employees serving in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
(State and municipal employees have their own pension systems.)
Table 11-6 describes the main rules for eligibility and benefits in the special
pension regimes for civil servants. The ceiling for contributions and benefits in the main system in 2007 was 2,802 reais equivalent to 7.6 times the
minimum monthly wage (US$1,381.50 in 2007). In other special programs,
the pension is equal to the worker’s final monthly wage, with no predefined

17:40

None

None

Integral pensions
included

Close to 11,000 reais,
never implemented
None

Equal to final salary

Equal to final salary

None

Equal to final salary

Equal to final salary

For new contracts and
earnings over 2,400
reais

Average of all
contributions
Reduced by 5% per year
since 2006
Minimum reduction of
30% for values above
1,058 reais
Approximately 12,700
reais
11% for all

Unchanged

11% for pensions over 1,200 reais
(states and municipalities);
1,440 reais (federal); and 2,400
reais (survivor pensions)
New contracts and earnings above
2,400 reais. DC plans under
public management

70% of values, benefits, or salaries
above 2,802 reais (2006 INSS
ceiling)
Undefined (around 20,000 reais)

Average of all contributions since
July 1994 (start of Real Plan)
Reduced by 3.5% per year

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchanged

20 years in public service, 10 in the
office

EC-41 Approved in
the National Congress
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Sources: Law 8.112/90, Constitutional Amendments 20 and 41, Proposed Amendment 40a.

Complementary benefits
for civil servants

Benefit ceiling for civil
servants
Contributions by retired
and survivor
Pensioners

Value of benefits at age
53
Value of public-sector
survivor pensions

Equal to final salary

5 years less service

Unchanged

35 years in public
service, 20 in the
office, 10 on the job
Unchanged

PEC-40 Sent by
Lula Administration

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

5 years younger, 5 fewer
years of contribution
Equivalent to final salary

53 year for current
workers, 60 for new
35 years of contribution

None
35 years of service

10 years in the office, 5
on the job

None

Time of contribution in
public service for
integral retirement
Minimum age for
integral retirement
Time of contribution to
social security
Access to benefits for
women
Value of integral benefits

1999–2003 EC-20

Until 1998

Parameters for Age and
Value of Benefits

Table 11-5 Special Civil Servant Retirement Regimes (1998–2003)

11-Kay-and-Sinha-c11
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Medical examination
Birth of child
Age 65 and older living in families
with per capita income less than
25% of the minimum wage
Medical examination
None

12 months
10 months
None

15 years (regular
occupation for rural
insured)
12 months

30–34 years for men and
25–29 for women

35 years for men and 30
for women

Length of Contribution

100% of last contribution wage

Same as ATC without the social security
factor
91% of the formula adopted for
permanent disability
50% plus 1% for each year of contribution
100% of the last wage for 120 days
1 monthly minimum wage

Average of 80% of the highest
contributions for INSSa since July 1994
and 100% of all civil servants’ salaries
Between 70 and 94% of the total
retirement pension for the full
contribution period
Same as ATC requirements (1 minimum
monthly wage for rural insured)

Replacement Rate

where f = social security factor; E s = life expectancy at retirement; Tc = time of contribution at retirement; Id = age at retirement; and a = contribution
quotient of 0.31.

Sources: Laws 8112/90 and 8213/91.
a Multiplied by the social security factor (only for the INSS insured), which includes the record of contributions, the age of the insured and the expected
longevity (without gender discrimination) at the retirement age, a similar formula as that used in Sweden and Italy. The formula adopted for Brazil is:


(Id + Tc × a)
Tc × a
× 1+
f =
Es
100

Benefits due to labor accidents

Sick leave allowance
Maternity aid
Aid to the aged

Death of the insured

Age 60 for men and 55 for women
in the civil service. No minimum
age in the general regime
Age 53 for men and 48 for women.
Not available for new contributors
since December 1998
Age 65 for men and 60 for women,
with 5-year reduction for rural
workers
Medical examination

Eligibility

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

Retirement due to permanent
disability
Survivor’s pension on death

Retirement based on the
proportional number of
years of contribution
Retirement based on age

Full retirement for time of
contribution (ATC)

Benefit

Table 11-6 Eligibility for Primary Benefits (Special Regimes)
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ceiling. The floor benefit in both programs is 1 minimum monthly wage
(approximately US$181 in 2007).
The system also includes two supplemental regimes:

r Closed private pension programs (Entidades Fechadas de Previdência
Complementar, or EFPC) are for workers (or a category of workers)
in a given firm. The majority of these programs are DC. Supervision
is the responsibility of the Secretary of Supplemental Pensions of the
Ministry of Social Security (Secretaria de Previdência Complementar,
or SPC).
r Open complementary private pension programs (EAPC, or Entidades
Abertas de Previdência Complementar), also generally DC, are open
to any worker seeking supplemental retirement savings. Benefit levels
vary by plan and are under the supervision of the Superintendency of
Private Insurance (Superintendência de Seguros Privados, or SUSEP)
at the Ministry of Finance.
Table 11-7 summarizes these supplemental systems. Despite a relatively
low rate of worker participation, the capital invested in these funds is a
significant percentage of GDP given the relative concentration of income
in Brazil.
With the passage of Constitutional Amendment 20 in 1998, firms began
to contribute increasingly to open over closed pension funds. In 2005 open
Table 11-7 Indicators and Coverage of the EFPC and EAPC (December 2005)
Financial Indicators
Funds as a percentage of GDPa
Contributors (millions)
Designated beneficiaries (thousands)
Beneficiaries (thousands)
Contributors as a percentage of the economically
active population (EAP)
Designated beneficiaries as a percentage of the
EAP (IBGE)
Beneficiaries as a percentage of total INSS
beneficiaries
Market share as percentage
Fund with highest market share (percentage)
Market share of largest 5 funds (percentage)

Closed (EFPC)

Open (EAPC)

13.8
1.73
3.984
560
2.72

3.8
6.08
NA
248
6.33

4.73

NA

2.65

1.18

69
25.9
49.0

31
41.7
79.2

Sources: SPC (2006), SUSEP (2006), and IBGE (2007).
Note: IBGE = Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, or Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.
a GDP data are from the 2007 GDP data-set revision (see IBGE 2007).
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Table 11-8 Principal Benefits Offered by Closed Pension
Funds (2005)
Ordinary retirement
Early retirement
Disability
Spousal pension
Pensions for dependents
Death benefit
Vesting

99%
43%
86%
72%
55%
41%
67%

Source: Towers Perrin (2005).

funds received 31 percent of total employer contributions compared to 18
percent in 1994. Changes in income tax laws in 2002 provided an additional
stimulus for firms to contribute to open funds. However, despite the influx
of funds, the system continues to be characterized by a low density of
contributions, with very few workers drawing benefits.
Table 11-8 shows that closed pension funds offer a range of benefits
accessible after a vesting period, including the withdrawal of funds, that
somewhat resemble a traditional life insurance policy. Table 11-9 demonstrates that replacement rates tend to be higher in closed funds for employees of state-owned firms and lower for other employees (especially in foreign firms).
In this respect, the coverage of the public systems and the closed complementary funds for workers in state-owned enterprises tend to offer better
guarantees than do other programs because they offer higher replacement
rates and are usually DB.

Financing Pensions
The question of how to finance the PAYGO pension programs has been
a major policy challenge. Some workers contribute regularly, but about
Table 11-9 Replacement Rate of Closed Pension Funds (2005)
Replacement Rate
80–100%
60–80%
40–60%
Up to 40%

Private Firms
(National)

Private Firms
(Foreign Owned)

State-Owned
Firms

20%
26%
24%
2%

1%
24%
8%
1%

38%
26%
12%
—

Source: Towers Perrin (2005).
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50 percent of the working population, including rural workers, domestic
employees, and workers in the informal urban economy, generally do
not. The financing arrangements established in the 1988 Constitution
are intended to compensate for workers’ differing abilities to contribute
by redistributing funds collected by levies on a broader revenue base. It
classified the heterogeneous conditions of each benefit as:

r conditions of a contributive character, such as retirement based on
time of contribution, which does not tend to involve transferring funds
between generations;
r conditions of a partially contributive character, such as retirement by
age, which requires a certain degree of redistribution of funds between
generations; and
r conditions of a universal nature, such as welfare benefits, which do not
call for contributions and have an explicitly redistributive character.
The system for funding health, welfare, and social security benefits reflects
this mix of contribution-based and universal benefits.2 The sources of funds
for social security are captive, and based on four principal sources (see
Table 11-10). The Constitution requires that a specific budget be drawn
up, distinct from the federal fiscal budget, with exclusive sources of funds
to finance social security.3 Over time, the social security budget has also
begun to receive revenue collected on financial transactions.4
In the civil servants’ systems, employees must contribute a minimum of
11 percent of their wages. Their employers (federal, state, and municipal
governments) contribute up to 11 percent or more, depending on the
region, and must cover the difference between what is collected and spent
on benefits.
Closed pension plans are increasingly moving from DB to DC systems.
In 1994 43 percent of the closed plans were either DC or mixed systems
with both DC and DB. By 2004, 89 percent of the funds were straight DC
or mixed. Employers were beginning to shoulder less of the administrative
costs. In 2000, 8 percent of affiliated employees paid administrative fees on
closed pension funds, while by 2004 that figure had risen to 17 percent.

Coverage and Contributors: The Origin
of the Problem
The principal source of the financial disequilibrium in Brazil is that benefit coverage for senior citizens is nearly universal, while the total number of workers contributing to the system is quite limited. This trend
becomes clear in Table 11-11, which compares coverage levels among persons aged 60 years or older with the economically active population and
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Table 11-10 Sources of Financing for Social Security Expenditures
Contribution
Contributions from
employees

Contributions by
employers

Levying Base
Gross wages up to a
ceiling of
approximately 10
CWs
Payroll

Contributions by
Income up to the
self-employed workers
ceiling of 10 CWs

Contributions by special
rural, fishing and
mining contributors
(family economies)
Contribution for
financing social
security (COFINS)
Contribution on
companies’ net
profits (CSLL)
Funding from the
federal government
(National Treasury)
Income from lotteries
Provisional contribution
on financial
transactions (CPMF)

Revenue from sales

Integrated system for
paying taxes and
labor obligations by
very small and small
companies
(SIMPLES)a
Other income

Sales by very small
companies
(minimum 5%) and
small companies (up
to 10%)

Companies’ monthly
sales
Companies’ net profit

Fiscal budget

Net income
Bank operations (with
some exemptions)

Rate
7.65% to 1 CW, 8.65% from 1
CW to 3 CWs, 9% from 3 to
5 CWs, 11% from 5 to 10
CWs
20% over the total, 1–3% to
cover labor accidents, 15%
when contracting
self-employed workers
20% over the class of income,
subdivided into multiples
of the CW, limited by the
INSS floor and ceiling
(11% for 1 CW)
2% plus 0.1% to cover labor
accidents

7.6% for companies in
general (financial
institutions are exempted)
8% for companies in general
and 18% for financial
institutions
Depending on the need for
financing
60% of all weekly revenue
0.38% on each transaction,
0.2% for health care, 0.1%
to the INSS, and 0.08% to
antipoverty programs
2–2.7% (depending on sales)
as contribution of
employers on payroll, 2%
as COFINS, and 1% as
CSLL

Income from bonds and Depends on the earnings of
securities or real
each security, bond, or
estate
rental or sale of real estate

Sources: Law 8.212/91, updated by Constitutional Amendment 20/98 and Law 9.876/99.
Note: CW = contribution wages.
a The SIMPLES (tax) system replaces the COFINS.
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Table 11-11 Benefit Coverage via Social Security Income Transfers (as % of
Total Population)
Population Coverage

1981–4

1985–9

1990–3

1995–8

1999–2002

2003–4

Economically active
Family dependents
Old age (60 years+)

39.2
65.0
50.1

38.4
63.5
56.3

36.3
61.2
67.6

32.6
56.3
76.7

32.7
54.7
77.5

34.1
54.6
77.7

Source: IBGE.
Notes: Table does not include Bolsa Família (family allowance benefit). No data for 1991,
1994, and 2000.

their dependents. Direct coverage for individuals aged 60 years and older
has tended to increase in recent years, while coverage for the other 2 groups
has stagnated.
The coverage of those aged 60 years or older is high and increases with
age. For instance, in 2001 70 percent of the population aged 65–69 years
received a benefit, and an additional 20.8 percent of the population was
covered through a family member. For those aged 70–74 years, those figures
were 75.9 and 20 percent, respectively, according to Cordero (2005).
At older ages, coverage reaches very high levels—although not universal,
it is nearly so. In recent studies, both the ILO and the World Bank have
pointed to Brazil as an exemplary case with respect to coverage. However,
the same cannot be said about the risks that affect current workers and their
dependents; less than two-thirds of this population is covered and coverage
rates remain low. As more workers enter the informal sector, the number of
families with at least one member contributing to social security continues
to decline. If this trend is not reversed, the system will experience growing
costs and greater inequality.

Differing Diagnoses: Financing and
Social Conditions
There is a wide-ranging debate over what actions are necessary to achieve
pension reform in Brazil, a debate complicated by the lack of consensus
about the reliability of basic social indicators. Issues in the debate range
from the effectiveness of income transfers to the degree to which deficits
or surpluses justify reform measures.

Social Conditions, Targeting, and Seguridade
Pension payments play an increasingly important role in reducing poverty
for families with income below 50 percent of the per capita minimum
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salary. In 1992 49 percent of all Brazilian families would have had income
below the poverty line if not for INSS payments that reduced the figure to
42 percent. There was a dramatic improvement by 2003, when 43 percent
of families were below the poverty line without INSS payments and 32
percent were below after receiving benefits (according to Paiva, Passos, and
Ansiliero 2005, based on IBGE data).
Despite the effectiveness of the INSS as an antipoverty program, if its
purpose is to reduce poverty, then its benefits could be targeted more
effectively. INSS benefit levels are linked to the minimum wage, but since
only 30 percent of beneficiaries are below the poverty line, raising the
minimum wage is not the most efficient way to target the poor. A 40-real
increase in the Bolsa Família (family allowance), which benefits families
in both the formal and informal sectors, would have the same povertyreducing impact as a 10 percent hike in the minimum wage at two-thirds
of the cost according to Barros and Carvalho (2005). Raising the minimum wage is not an effective way to combat poverty, they say, because
the retired already receive an elevated level of income transfers, making
it more effective to (a) transfer income to the poorest segments of the
population, reducing retirement payments to the minimum level, and
(b) raise Bolsa Família benefits for families with children up to 14 years
old.
One element often overlooked in Brazil’s social debate is the link
between the 1988 Constitution and poverty reduction. The Constitution
preserves (in part) the value of benefits, which has reduced the incidence
of indigence and poverty among the elderly. Dain and Lavinas (2005)
report that indigence among those older than 65 years fell from 3 percent
in 1981 to 1 percent in 2003, while the absolute number of those older than
60 years living in extreme poverty fell by half. As Lavinas (2006) notes, when
a benefit is not considered a ‘right’, the poor and indigent are not always
identified because, beyond meeting the necessary requirements, they often
lack information or voice (many of the poor lack required documents or
even a postal address).
Targeted income transfer programs can generate inefficiencies, and not
all of those eligible ultimately receive benefits. The recently launched
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD, a national household survey) reveals that food security assistance reached only 18 million
of 45 million households facing food insecurity. The PNAD survey also
demonstrates that among indigent families with an income of 25 percent
of the minimum wage or less, half have not applied for assistance. In other
words, the coverage deficit is the largest in the most vulnerable groups.
It is apparent that in Brazil, with its weak state capacity, profound social
inequality, and large numbers of poor individuals with low education levels,
targeting does not reach the most needy.5
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Financing, Spending, and Long-Term Equilibrium
Many analysts suggest that reform efforts since 1993, while significant, have
been insufficient, given projected actuarial shortfalls that could have grave
macroeconomic implications in the future. Furthermore, the growing INSS
deficits and rising expenditures on public servant pensions have brought
on a fiscal crisis that has led to public spending being increasingly directed
toward benefits rather than investment.
Giambiagi et al. (2004) demonstrate that the differences between revenue collection and expenditures are growing. Even though the deficit has
grown faster for civil servants (because there is no specific contribution for
the employer), INSS expenditures have expanded at an even faster rate
(see Table 11-12).
Generous rules guiding benefits also contribute to financial shortfalls.
According to the World Bank (2001) and Giambiagi et al. (2004), the
relatively high value and long duration of pensions granted based on time
of contribution are especially costly. Giambiagi et al. argue further that noncontributory pensions are relatively ineffective social policies that create a
vicious cycle due to their high cost, which leads to high payroll taxes that in
turn provide an incentive for joining the informal sector.
From this perspective, the solution is to adopt new constitutional reforms
to guarantee benefits proportional to contributions and to avoid unrestricted spending on noncontributory benefits. Table 11-13 presents potential financial scenarios according to differing reforms, GDP growth, and
minimum wages.
Giambiagi et al. (2004) say that reforms are necessary to contain costs,
which could reach 10 percent of GDP, assuming moderate economic
growth and a continued rise in the real value of the minimum wage.
The authors point to acceleration in growth in assistance and time-ofcontribution benefits, which will lead to worsening deficits unless a reform
is enacted. The proposed reforms project that expenditures would fall
to 6.9 percent of GDP assuming 3 percent annual GDP growth, and 5.6
percent of GDP with an annual GDP growth of 4 percent.
There are different perspectives on the link between the financial crisis
and the reform process. According to Dain (2003) and ANFIP (2005),
the 1988 Constitution requires that taxes on corporate earnings (COFINS,
or Contribuição Social para Financiamento da Seguridade Social), profits (CSLL, or Contribuições sobre o Lucro Líquido), and payroll taxes
were intended to finance pensions, health, and social assistance. Since the
constitutional reform of 1993–4, the government has diverted more than
20 percent of COFINS, CSLL, and CPMF (Contribuição Provisória sobre
Movimentação Financeira, literally ‘temporary contribution on financial
transactions’) to other expenditures (see Table 11-14), and was authorized
to do so through 2007. Critics argue that this practice deviates from the
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—
4.6
4.6
(2.6)
0.9
3.5
(2.6)
5.5
8.1

(0.1)
4.8
4.9
(3.4)
0.6
4.1
(3.5)
5.4
9.0

1996
(0.3)
4.7
5.0
(3.2)
0.6
3.8
(3.4)
5.4
8.8

1997
(0.7)
4.8
5.4
(3.5)
0.7
4.1
(4.1)
5.4
9.5

1998
(0.9)
4.6
5.5
(3.4)
0.6
4.0
(4.3)
5.2
9.5

1999
(0.8)
4.8
5.6
(3.6)
0.6
4.2
(4.5)
5.3
9.8

2000
(1.0)
4.8
5.8
(3.9)
0.6
4.4
(4.9)
5.3
10.2

2001
(1.1)
4.8
5.9
(3.6)
0.5
4.2
(4.7)
5.4
10.1

2002
(1.6)
4.8
6.3
(3.1)
0.6
3.8
(4.9)
5.2
10.2

2003

a GDP

(1.6)
4.8
6.5
(3.1)
0.6
3.7
(4.7)
5.5
10.2

2004

(1.7)
5.1
6.8
(2.9)
0.9
3.8
(4.6)
6.0
10.6

2005

(1.8)
5.3
7.1
(2.8)
1.1
3.8
(4.6)
6.4
10.9

2006 b

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

Sources: Giambiagi et al. (2004: 6), based on data from the Ministries of Plan and Social Security; IBGE (2007).
data are from the 2007 GDP data-set revision (see IBGE 2007).
b Preliminary data and authors’ estimate.

Operational imbalance
INSS revenue
Expenditure
Civil servants
Revenue
Expenditure
Total
Revenue
Expenditure

1995

Table 11-12 Pension System Operating Results (as a % of GDP)a
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Table 11-13 INSS Expenditure Projections Measured (as a % of GDP)
Scenario with Reforma

Scenario without Reform

GDP
2005
2030

Minimum Wage
Indexed to
Inflation

Minimum Wage Grows at
Same Rate as Growth in
Per Capita GDP

3.0
7.8
9.2

3.0
7.8
10.0

4.0
7.7
7.4

4.0
7.8
8.4

3.0
7.8
6.9

4.0
7.7
5.6

Source: Giambiagi et al. (2004: 34), based on data from the IBGE and Ministry of Social
Security.
a Giambiagi et al. (2004) assume a minimum retirement age 55 years in 2010 and 65 years in
2025. During this period, the retirement age difference between men and women would be
gradually reduced. In 2025, women would have a retirement age of 63 years with 33 years of
required contributions. In addition, special benefits for preschool through middle-school
teachers would be eliminated. Finally, the minimum benefit would be adjusted only for
inflation. Old-age social assistance benefits would be set at 80% of the minimum pension
and unlinked from the minimum wage, and granted at age 70 rather than at age 65, as is
currently the case.

original 1988 Constitution, arguing that if all revenues had been spent on
social security, revenues would have exceeded benefits, generating a huge
surplus. In short, from this perspective, the INSS was not the source of the
growing deficit.6
Others argue that these revenue losses occurred due to nonpayment of
taxes, evasion, and fraud (see Table 11-15), facilitated by weak enforcement (ANFIP 2005). Revenue collection could be dramatically improved
Table 11-14 Annual Social Security Budget (as a % of GDP)a
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Revenue
INSS
COFINS
CPMF
CSLL
Expenditures
Pension (INSS)
Health (SUS)
Social assistance
Surplus

7.6
4.6
2.2
—
0.8
7.1
4.9
1.9
0.1
0.6

7.7
4.8
2.1
—
0.7
6.9
5.2
1.7
0.2
0.7

8.3
4.6
2.0
0.7
0.8
7.0
5.1
1.7
0.2
1.3

8.3
4.8
1.9
0.8
0.7
7.5
5.6
1.6
0.3
0.8

9.1
4.6
3.0
0.7
0.6
7.7
5.7
1.6
0.4
1.4

10.1 10.4 10.7 10.4 11.4 11.6
4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 5.1 5.1
3.4 3.6 3.6 3.4 4.0 4.1
1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2
7.8 8.2 8.2 8.5 8.9 9.4
5.9 6.2 6.2 6.6 6.7 6.9
1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8
2.2 2.2 2.5 1.8 2.5 2.3

11.9
5.5
3.9
1.3
1.2
9.9
7.2
1.7
1.0
2.0

Sources: ANFIP (2007), based on data from the Ministries of Finance and Planning; IBGE
(2007).
Note: SUS = Sistema Único de Saúde.
a GDP data are from the 2007 GDP data-set revision (IBGE 2007).
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Table 11-15 Potential Social Security Revenue Collection (as a % of GDP, Rev.
2007 Data)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nonpayment (a)
Fraud (b)
Evasion total (c = a + b)
Exempt (d)
Revenue collection (e )
Potential revenue
collection ( f = b + d + e )
Estimated losses
(g = f − e )

0.2
1.8
2.1
0.8
4.7
7.3

0.3
1.9
2.2
0.7
4.7
7.4

0.2
1.9
2.1
0.8
4.6
7.3

0.2
1.9
2.0
0.8
4.7
7.4

0.4
2.1
2.5
0.7
4.8
7.6

0.3
2.1
2.4
0.7
4.8
7.6

0.4
1.9
2.3
0.7
4.7
7.4

0.4
1.8
2.2
0.8
5.0
7.7

0.4
1.8
2.2
0.6
5.0
7.4

2.6

2.6

2.7

2.6

2.8

2.8

2.6

2.6

2.4

Source: ANFIP (2007).
Note: Deflator: National Consumer Price Index (INPC—Indice nacional dos preços ao
consumidor).

through increased compliance. Critics also argue that the granting of contribution exemptions, such as those given to philanthropic organizations
and exporters, is questionable, given the fact that benefits are linked to
contributions.
Note that policy assessments described in this section need to be viewed
with caution, given the fact that they often rely on contradictory and erroneous data. Meanwhile, spending continues to rise, while average benefits
do not satisfy basic needs. Policymakers face a clear agenda of improving
the efficiency and equity of benefits while at the same time creating better
conditions for business, investors, and labor.

Conclusions and Suggestions for an Alternative
Agenda
Since the regional trend toward individual accounts took off in the 1990s,
Brazil’s path toward social security reform has differed significantly from
that of its neighbors, focusing on universalizing benefit coverage and parametric reforms in the PAYGO public system rather than structural reform.
As described above, policies in recent years have been shaped by the range
of social protection codified in the 1988 Constitution, and the process of
social security reform has required investments of tremendous political
capital in order to amend the Constitution.
One conclusion that can be drawn from examining current debates in
Brazil is that the immediate policy challenges of improving equity and
efficiency can be met not only via constitutional reform, but, in the shorter
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Table 11-16 Occupations as Proportion of the Workforce and Salaries in
Selected Countries
Country

Brazil
Portugal
Spain
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Sweden
Eurozone

Wages and
Payroll/
GDP—2002

36.1
60.4
65.5
66.9
68.9
65.2
74.8
64.4

Occupational Structure 2002
Employers and
Self-Employed

Salaried
Workers

Domestic
Household
Workers

30.0
25.4
17.5
9.7
10.0
11.4
10.2
14.8

61.3
72.7
80.6
89.2
88.9
88.1
89.3
83.2

8.7
1.8
1.8
1.1
1.1
0.3
0.5
1.9

Average Wage
in Euros
(2001)a

5,138
13,338
17,432
27,319
38,204
37,677
31,620
29,627

Sources: IBGE (2003), OECD (2003), and Eurostat (2003).
and more employees.

a Ten

term through administrative reform, and improved regulatory and managerial performance.
Low levels of coverage for affiliates remain a basic problem in Brazil
and the rest of Latin America (Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2004: 273–5).7
Without higher salary levels, a largely formal and salaried labor sector, and
a high density of contributions, social security benefits cannot provide a
basic standard of living, nor is it possible to have a classic universal social
security system functioning with an actuarial equilibrium based on a social
insurance model (see Table 11-16).
With respect to current laws, changing survivorship rules and regulations
would reap clear savings. In Brazil, lifetime survivorship benefits are given
indiscriminately without regard to the age of the spouse, number of children in the family, or length of the marriage.8 Such permissive benefits
would be considered quite generous in the industrialized world, but seem
altogether out of place in a developing country like Brazil (Coutinho and
Ribeiro 2006).9 In Sweden, for example, able-bodied workers are eligible
for a universal survivor pension payable for 6 months after 5 years of
marriage, or for as long as the survivor is caring for a child younger than
12 years. Sweden’s six-month survivor pension stands in sharp contrast
to the situation in Brazil, where even a young adult capable of working
automatically receives lifetime benefits (see Table 11-17).
A similar principle exists with respect to disability: those capable of
working should be expected to do so. However, in Brazil, nearly all of
those classified as temporarily or permanently disabled are considered
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Table 11-17 Comparison of Survivor Benefits in Select Countries
Country

Requirements

Mexico

150 weeks of
contribution

USA

6 of 13 quarters
coverage prior
to death

Sweden

3-year residence

Italy

5 years
contributions,
3 in 5 prior to
death

Portugal

Deceased met
pension
requirements

Brazil

12 months of
contribution

Benefit
Private: 90% of the
value of the disability
pension
Public: 90% of insured’s
pension (both for
widow or dependent
disabled widower)
100% at retirement age,
payable to widow(er)
after minimum 10
years of marriage,
75% if disabled or
caring for a child
under aged 16
Maximum is 90%
reduced base amount,
40% of earnings
related pension (both
for 6 months). Special
survivor benefit if
survivor ill or
unemployed
60% of insured’s
pension, 100% for
spouse + 2 children,
Income test if granted
after September 1995
60% of insured’s
pension

100% for spouses or
dependents and up to
20% for orphans
through age 16 (or 24
if in school). The
pension is for life,
regardless of age

Sources: Social Security Administration (2002, 2004).

Termination
Remarriage: 3-year
lump sum

Age 18 for orphan
children in school.
Survivor retains
pension if remarries
after 60

Until dependent child
is aged 12

New marriage or age
of majority

5 years unless
surviving spouse
over 35 years of age,
disabled, or caring
for a child
Remarriage
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totally disabled. Appropriately classifying partially disabled workers would
encourage those who are capable of work to find suitable employment.
Another indicator that Brazil’s disability pensions are alarmingly and
disproportionately high is that expenditures associated with risk (disability
and survival pensions) have remained steady for twenty-five years, despite
the fact that the aged population has grown—and, since the constitutional
amendment of 1988, has enjoyed more generous benefits. Under these
circumstances, we would expect old-age pensions to increase as a proportion of overall pension expenditures. Nevertheless, disability and survival
pensions only fell from 38.2 percent of expenditures from 1980 through
1984 to 34.8 percent of expenditures between 2000 and 2004.
Furthermore, many workers continue to be formally employed even
while drawing pensions, a situation commonly justified by low benefits.
Seniors are thought to have no choice but to return to work. Since 1981 the
number of beneficiaries of retirement and survivorship pensions who are
employed has increased, due not only to Brazil’s rapid population growth
(from 110 million in 1981 to approximately 180 million in 2004) and economic crises, but also because of the large number of people who sought
early retirement ahead of the Cardoso administration’s pension reforms. A
growing number of these beneficiaries found employment in the informal
sector, as the percentage of employed pensioners not contributing to the
pension system expanded (see Table 11-18). Retired persons with lower
benefits are less likely to be employed, while retirees receiving higher
average benefits are more likely to be employed and to contribute to social
security.
The general argument for permitting individuals to have multiple benefits is this: because benefit levels are so low to begin with, people should
justifiably be able to accumulate more than one pension. However, that
Table 11-18 Retired and Survivor Pensioners’ Work Status (% for Selected
Years)
Beneficiaries

Retirement Benefit

Survivorship Benefit

1981 1990 1995 2004 1981 1990 1995 2004
Retired (not seeking
employment)
Retired and unemployed
Employed and a contributor
to pension system
Employed and a
noncontributor
Source: IBGE (PNAD) (2004).

80.9

76.9

65.2

67.0

73.5

72.4

66.5

70.7

0.2
6.4

0.2
6.2

0.6
6.4

0.8
6.0

1.4
14.0

0.8
13.0

1.6
11.2

2.0
8.9

12.6

16.7

27.8

26.2

11.0

13.8

20.8

18.4
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individuals receiving higher benefits tend to have multiple sources of
income while those with lower benefits do not suggest that permitting
multiple benefits leads to a higher concentration of income.
Although the population that retires relatively young and enjoys multiple
benefits is significant, the vast majority receive only the minimum pension.
The existence of this enormous population living in poverty raises the
question of the effectiveness of targeting or lowering the benefit floor.
Faced with a somewhat similar situation in Chile, the 2006 presidential
advisory commission took a different approach to addressing the role of
pensions in addressing poverty when it recommended a ‘solidarity’ pillar
that would reach the bottom 60 percent of earners (Consejo 2006).
Policymaking is clearly hampered by the absence of accurate data, which
is exemplified by conflicting data on worker mortality for those receiving
benefits based on thirty years of contributions (these conditions are more
typically met by workers in better remunerated jobs). Mortality is, of course,
a key indicator for determining the duration of benefits and for projecting
program costs. However, although workers tend to retire at relatively young
ages in Brazil, the duration of benefits does not in itself appear to be the
key problem for the private-sector workers pension system. Using Social
Security Ministry data (from the DATAPREV database; see MPAS 2005),
Table 11-19 shows that the average age when benefits are granted rose from
50 years for men and 48 years for women in 1997 to 54.8 years and 51.7
years in 2005, while the average age of cessation of benefits (i.e. death of
beneficiaries) was 71.3/66.3 years.
The age at which benefits cease due to death is actually lower than overall
average life expectancy, according to the 2004 government mortality tables,
which show benefits ceasing at age 77.7 years for men and 80.8 years for
women (after being granted at ages 55 and 52 years, respectively) (IBGE
2004). Comparing these numbers to the Ministry of Social Security numbers reveals a 6.6-year disparity for men and a 14.4-year disparity for women.
This discrepancy exemplifies the lack of reliable indicators in Brazil, an
especially serious problem for forecasting the long-term financing needs of
the pension system.10
Some analysts emphasize the critical importance of raising the retirement age (Giambiagi et al. 2004), although retirement systems throughout
the world permit early retirement in return for reduced benefits. However,
as Table 11-20 shows, the issue in Brazil has more to do with high replacement rates relative to overall worker contributions. Furthermore, it has
been possible since 1998 to alter how benefit formulas are calculated via
ordinary law. This is not the case with raising the retirement age, which
requires the very cumbersome process of constitutional reform. At the
same time, 68 percent of the EAP and 44 percent of the working-age labor
force work in occupations where social rights and legal protections are
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First granted
Average beneficiary
Benefit ceases
First granted
Average beneficiary
Benefit ceases

Men

Source: MPAS (2005).

Women

Benefit Status
53.6
62.4
69.2
51.5
60.3
68.6

1992
53.4
62.1
68.8
51.2
59.5
66.2

1993
53.1
62.0
68.3
50.9
59.3
65.2

1994
51.8
61.6
68.0
49.9
58.7
64.4

1995
50.2
60.9
68.0
48.8
58.2
64.0

1996
49.7
60.2
66.6
48.3
57.4
60.7

1997
50.7
60.1
67.9
49.0
57.3
62.3

1998
52.9
60.6
68.8
50.6
57.6
64.9

1999
53.1
61.3
69.4
50.9
58.2
67.0

2000
53.3
61.9
69.9
51.1
58.8
67.2

2001

54.3
62.4
70.5
51.7
59.2
67.4

2002

54.8
63.0
70.7
51.7
59.6
66.5

2003

54.8
63.5
71.0
51.8
60.1
65.9

2004

54.8
64.1
71.3
51.7
60.5
66.3

2005
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Table 11-20 Average Age, Legal Age, and Replacement Rates for Retirement
Pensions in 2001
Retirement Pensions
by Country and Type

Brazil (TC)
France
Italy
Brazil (TC + urban, by age)
Spain
Germany
Sweden
United Kingdom
Portugal

Average Retirement
Age (Years)

53.7
58.7
60.4
60.8
61.4
61.6
63.2
63.2
64.5

Legal Retirement
Age (Years)
Men

Women

65
60
65
65
65
65
65
65
65

60
60
60
60
65
65
65
65
65

Benefit as
a Percentage
of Salary
88/92a
75
65
91/74b
65
75
NA
48
54

Sources: MPAS (2001), IBGE (2001b ), and Eurostat (2003); 2004 figures for Brazil INSS
(excluding the special regimes).
Note: TC = time of contribution.
a Compared to salaried contributors. Figures come from two different sources (MPAS 2001
cites 92%; IBGE 2001b cites 88%).
b Compared to the employed workforce. Figures come from two different sources (MPAS
2001 cites 91% and IBGE 2001b cites 74%).

not respected (IBGE 2001b). The cost of the generous pensions enjoyed
by a small percentage of retired workers is borne by that relatively small
portion of the labor force that contributes at very high rates, which in turn
encourages increased evasion.
The evasion problem could be solved with the adoption of a zero pillar/tier that pays a basic benefit to all workers, regardless of total contributions for old age. This kind of minimum income benefit could be complemented with a pension based on a classical social insurance scheme with DB
and calculated strictly according to the effective contributions. For workers
preferring higher income during retirement, market solutions including
DC plans and voluntary saving could be encouraged. Such a scheme would
be feasible with much lower contribution rates and an actuarially accurate
formula that fixes replacement rates according to international standards.
This solution would cover the needs of the retired without encouraging
early retirement and the accumulation of multiple pensions by middle-class
workers.
In coping with these challenges, it is important to emphasize that the
lengthy process of constitutional reform is not the only nor necessarily the
most effective method to reform social security and bring financial stability.
Parametric reforms, including administrative measures, play an important
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role and could bring faster and more immediate results. Administrative
reforms can present an effective financial solution without the political
challenges of amending the Constitution.
Administrative measures could include:

r Eliminating risk-based benefits for those who do not need them. Partially disabled workers can continue to work in some capacity.

r Verifying more diligently disability status and ceasing total disability
status for those capable of working.

r Preventing disability through better monitoring of workplace safety.
The following measures could be taken via ordinary legislative reforms:

r Imposing restrictions on receiving one or more pension benefits while
still receiving wages from employment.

r In granting death benefits, considering the presence or absence of
minor children and the capacity of survivors to be employed.

r Granting partial disability status when appropriate.

Arguments that Brazil’s social expenditures are elevated given its stage of
development (see Giambiagi et al. 2004) should be viewed with caution.
Although Brazil’s population is relatively young compared to European
countries, its population is aging at a faster rate (UN 2004). As the rate
of economic growth has slowed, income transfers have increased fiscal
pressure. Table 11-21 suggests that Brazilian spending on old-age pensions
could be considered relatively low compared to that in Mexico, which has
a higher rate of growth, and the USA, which has a social protection system
that assigns a greater role to the market and individual initiative.
As Gillion et al. (2000) point out, any analysis of social spending must
consider total spending and not just public-sector expenditures. Spending
should be viewed according to the age profile of the population to assess
the level of spending with respect to the covered population. Such an
exercise suggests that public expenditures on survivorship benefits in Brazil
(3.1% of GDP) are overly generous (see Table 11-21). The rapid rise in
spending on disability benefits and family income support in a population
where fewer workers are contributing is also cause for concern.11 Policymakers may wish to devote greater attention toward reforming rules over
survivorship benefits.
Furthermore, the lack of integration among health, welfare, and pension policies creates duplication and waste, as does weak administration,
which results in fraud. Operational costs (including personnel expenditures) in Brazil represent a relatively high 3.7 percent of total benefits.12
Furthermore, up to 20 percent of benefits contain ‘irregularities’, and it is
projected that annual losses are equivalent to 15 percent of total revenue
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10.3
0.5
1.9
1.9
15.8

11.3
0.4
2.0
1.9
16.3

2003
9.4
2.2
1.8
0.6
16.5

1995
11.3
2.5
1.8
1.2
17.0

2003

Italy

0.6
0.2
0.1
0.1
3.9

1995
1.0
0.3
0,1
1.0
8.1

2003

Mexico

6.5
1.9
5.8
1.1
17.1

1995
8.8
1.0
3.4
1.5
17.0

2003

Poland

6.5
1.3
2.5
0.8
11.2

1995
7.0
1.6
2.6
1.6
13.1

2003

Portugal

9.9
0.7
5.1
3.8
19.4

1995
10.1
0.7
6.0
3.5
17.9

2003

Sweden

5.4
1.0
1.2
0.6
8.2

1995
5.5
0.8
1.3
0.7
7.6

2003

USA

4.2
2.0
1.0
0.5
7.7

1995

4.9
2.5
1.4
0.6
9.4

2003

Brazil

5.4
3.1
1.9
1.1
11.5

2006

a GDP

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

Sources: IBGE (2007) and OECD (2007).
data are from the 2007 GDP data-set revision (see IBGE 2007).
b Old-age benefits include INSS old age and time of service pensions, and civil service pensions from the three branches of government for urban
and rural workers. Some analysts view rural benefits as social assistance better categorized as family benefits, but according to Law 8.213/91 they
are required to be integrated into Social Security (Previdência Social). In 1995 rural benefits were equal to 1.18% of GDP, and in 2005 they had
risen to 1.24% of GDP.
c Survivor benefits include all INSS and civil service survivorship benefits.
d Disability includes INSS and civil service disability and sickness benefits.
e Family benefits include benefits for the aged who live in families considered poor, and also incorporates targeted assistance and income transfer
programs like Bolsa Família and Bolsa Escola. Maternity and small child benefits are also included. Family benefits for workers with income below
three contribution salaries are also included.

Old ageb
Survivorc
Disabilityd
Familye
Total

1995

Germany

Table 11-21 Public Social Expenditures (as a % of GDP)a
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due to improper revenue collection and benefit payments. Because of these
inefficiencies, elevated tax rates place an onerous burden on families and
firms, stifling potential economic growth.13
Resolving these administrative and legislative challenges could facilitate
political support for new constitutional reforms. Brazil’s 1988 Constitution
raised the benefit floor and facilitated access to benefits for the needy.
Social security pensions were the primary government social program and
played a key role in reducing poverty. As discussed above, significant steps
can be taken to reduce overall pension expenditures in Brazil, primarily
through addressing the benefits that are exceptionally generous by international standards without reducing basic benefits, which play a critical
antipoverty role.
It is clear that the process of administrative and legislative reform at
the subconstitutional level should be accelerated. It is also apparent, given
the current distribution of benefits, that the pension system cannot be
sustained by payroll taxes alone and that a strong basic antipoverty benefit
is necessary given the significant number of workers earning wages at or
close to the minimum wage. The creation of reserves or a system of partial capitalization could contribute to easing demographic transitions and
stimulate market-led investment—which could also broaden the market
for complementary pension funds geared toward professionals. However,
any such reforms require transparency and must be done in such a way to
minimize both risks and administrative costs.

Notes
1

In July 2004 the Supreme Court ruled that retired civil servants have to contribute 11% of their pensions on the amount exceeding the INSS ceiling and that
survivor benefits be reduced by 30% below the covered worker’s retirement benefit
only for pensions above the ceiling. Otherwise, civil servants would receive benefits
lower than those of workers in the INSS even though contribution rates would be
the same.
2
Law 8.213 provides that civil and military federal, state, and municipal employees
covered by specific statutes are exempt from paying into social security. Expenditures on these pensions were are not part of the OSS seguridade budget that encompasses all the federal government’s expenditures on health care, social assistance,
and pension coverage, but were later added. OSS coverage of non-pension related
expenditures was originally an interim measure, but will likely be extended.
3
As mentioned above, the constitutional reform of 1994 allowed the administration to reallocate 20% of revenue to other areas.
4
The provisional financial transactions tax (the CPMF) was introduced to help
fund health-care expenditures when the resources that had been provided by payroll taxes or collected by the INSS were no longer directed toward health care.
5
According to Lavinas (2006), among the poorest 10% of the population, 37% are
single heads of households with children, with a median monthly family income of
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12 reais, compared to 24 reais for 2-parent families (comprising 48% of the poorest
10%). Of these single-parent families, two-thirds are not covered by any type of
income transfer compared to 50% of 2-parent families.
6
The economic difficulties of the 1990s led to higher unemployment and informality, which led to a reduction in payroll tax revenue for financing social security.
This ultimately led to a rise in taxes on profits, earnings, and financial transactions.
7
Gill et al. (2005) see a positive correlation between higher income levels, the
number of regular contributors, and contribution density. The authors point out,
however, that coverage rates vary widely among countries with similar levels of
income. This suggests that other factors, such as confidence in institutions or
market incentives, can play an important role. The authors foresee an active role
for government in reducing poverty levels among senior citizens.
8
Benefits end upon remarriage.
9
A court decision even permitted a woman to receive two state-funded survivorship pensions: one from her son and the other from her husband (Diário de São
Paulo 2005).
10
Furthermore, note that survivorship pension benefits are not taken into consideration when calculating the social security factor (described above). Because
there is no minimum age to qualify for a benefit, the payout period can last for
several decades. In fact, DATAPREV data does not include information on the
duration of benefits or even the average age of the beneficiary. The lack of an INSS
mortality table and the failure to include survivor pensions leads to gross errors
and erroneous diagnoses based on inadequate data. Consequently, any financial
projections using these assumptions are questionable, if not useless.
11
Assembling crossnational indicators is complicated given differences in coverage,
income supports, and the mix between private and public provision. These indicators serve as a reference to evaluate spending levels, which in turn can affect public
finance and international competitiveness.
12
Administrative costs of 3.7% of benefits are higher than in other countries. In the
USA, administrative costs in 1992 were 0.7%; in Switzerland, 0.8%; in Japan, 0.3%;
and in Italy, 3.4% (WB 1994: 312).
13
Upon his resignation in March 2005, Social Security Minister Amir Lando argued
that current benefits needed to be audited and that social security records should
be compared with income tax and health records. Finance Minister Antônio Palocci
later stated that reducing social security fraud and evasion would enable the government to increase the primary fiscal surplus without resorting to a constitutional
reform of the pension system (see Agencia O Globo 2005).
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